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I. Introduction
It’s a common scenario, played out numerous times every business day:
Sam Salesperson is very excited. He has just been offered a position by ABC
Corp., a promising start-up company, to be their salesperson for their brand new
medical software system in the territory of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. The
head of human resources hands him a document entitled “Noncompete
Agreement” and tells him he will need to sign it before he can officially be hired.
Excited about the opportunity ahead, Sam signs the document, which prohibits
him from working for a competitor in Pennsylvania or New Jersey for one year
after he leaves ABC Corp.
Sam starts work and does a good job for ABC Corp., but then one day he has a
dispute with his boss and leaves to work for a competitor…
Section two of this article will provide a brief introduction to employer-employee
noncompete agreement1 analysis and explore the preliminary issue of consideration.
Section three will analyze the criteria and differing approaches courts use to determine
the validity of a noncompete agreement, including the requirement of an employer’s
legitimate business interest and the reasonableness of the occupational limitations and the
geographic and temporal scope of the agreement. Section four will survey the current
judicial and statutory responses to unreasonable terms in a noncompete agreement.
Sections five and six critique the varying approaches and suggest a model statute to
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These types of agreements are known by several terms, including “Covenant not to
Compete” and “Noncompetition Agreement.” This article will use the term noncompete
agreement.

address unreasonable terms in noncompete agreements. This model will take into
account a factor heretofore generally ignored by jurisdictions in their approach to
unreasonable noncompete terms: the relationship between consideration and the
reasonableness of the agreement.

II. Overview of Noncompete Agreements
This section first provides a brief introduction to the framework of noncompete
agreement analysis and then explores the differing approaches jurisdictions use when
addressing the preliminary issue of consideration for a noncompete agreement.
A. Introduction
Noncompete agreements between employers and employees have been
commonplace for over a century.2 While the precise laws controlling the enforceability of
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Noncompete agreements, and judicial and scholarly analysis of noncompete
agreements, have been around for centuries. See Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowell Co.,
994 S.W.2d 468, 471(Ark. 1999) (noting that litigation over noncompete agreements has
been around for over 500 years); Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete,
73 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 629-646 (1960) (surveying the development of English common
law on noncompete agreements). For an historical perspective of noncompete agreements
in the United States up through the early 1950s, see the opinion in Arthur Murray Dance
Studios of Cleveland v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio Com Pl. 1952) (The court provides
a thorough survey of secondary source materials, which the court colorfully refers to as
various "seas” of periodicals, annotations, encyclopedias, and restatements). See also
Zabota Community Center v. Frolova, 2006 WL 2089828 at *1 (Mass. Super.):
The legal history of these kinds of situations or agreements dates back at least to 19th
Century England. Lord Macnaughten, in Nordenfeldt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns &
Ammunition, [1894] A.C. 535, at 565, reminded his readers that enforcement of these
kinds of agreements is an exception to the general rule. He said:
The public have an interest in every person's carrying on his trade freely: so has
the individual. All interference with individual liberty of action in trading, and all
restraints of trade themselves, if there is nothing more, are contrary to public
policy, and therefore void. That is the general rule. But there are exceptions:
2

these agreements vary from state to state,3 the following generic standard, applicable in
most jurisdictions,4 provides a useful framework for surveying the basic principles courts
used to determine if a noncompete agreement between an employer and employee will be
upheld:
The test applied is whether or not the restraint is necessary for the
protection of the business or good will of the employer, and if so, whether
the stipulation has imposed upon the employee any greater restraint than is
reasonably necessary to protect the employer's business, regard being had
to the nature and character of the employment, the time for which the
restriction is imposed, and the territorial extent of the locality to which the
prohibition extends.5
restraints of trade and interference with individual liberty of action may be
justified by the special circumstances of a particular case. It is a sufficient
justification, and indeed it is the only justification, if the restriction is reasonable
reasonable, that is, in reference to the interest of the parties concerned and
reasonable in reference to the interest of the public, so framed and so guarded as
to afford adequate protection to the party in whose favour it is imposed, while at
the same time it is in no way injurious to the public. That, I think, is the fair result
of all of the authorities.
3
For a thorough compilation of the laws applicable to noncompete agreements and each
jurisdiction, see Brian M. Malsberger, ed., Covenants Not to Compete: A State-By-State
Survey (4th ed. BNA Books 2004). Throughout this article, general propositions will be
presented and representative case law will be cited. This article does not purport to
capture the subtle nuances of every component of noncompete agreement analysis (many
of which are based upon the myriad factual scenarios that develop in employer-employee
relationships), particularly in sections two and three, where each of the sub-sections could
be the subject of a law review article. The Malsberger book and the ALR articles cited
herein provide literally thousands of pages of case law and citations exploring every facet
of noncompete agreement analysis and provide a good staring point for research on a
particular jurisdictions standards.
4
But See Peter J. Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses in
Employment Contracts, 15 J. Corp. L. 483, 485 (1990) (contending that the variations
amongst the jurisdictions make predictability difficult).
5
Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 134 N.W.2d 892, 899 (Minn. 1965); See e.g. Tex.
Bus. & Com.Code § 15.50 (2002):
Criteria for Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete
(a) Notwithstanding Section 15.05 of this code, and subject to any applicable
provision of Subsection (b), a covenant not to compete is enforceable if it is
ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement at the time the
agreement is made to the extent that it contains limitations as to time,
3

Most courts also note that the law looks at these contracts with "disfavor"6 and
subjects them to careful scrutiny.7 This type of verbiage is common in
noncompete cases and makes it clear that courts will not treat these types of
contracts under the same freedom of contract type of analysis found elsewhere in
contract law.8 Many courts have characterized these agreements as one of
"adhesion."9
B. Consideration

geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained that are reasonable and do
not impose a greater restraint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other
business interest of the promisee.
6
Sysco Food Services of Eastern Wis., LLC v. Ziccarelli, 445 F.Supp.2d 1039, 1043
(E.D. Wis. 2006) ("[C]ovenants not to compete are generally disfavored in the law.");
Intermountain Eye and Laser Centers, P.L.L.C. v. Miller, 127 P.3d 121, 127 (Idaho 2005)
(“Covenants not to compete in employment contracts are “disfavored’”); Murfreesboro
Medical Clinic, P.A. v. Udom,166 S.W.3d 674, 678 (Tenn.2005)(“ In general, covenants
not to compete are disfavored in Tennessee”); Trilogy Software, Inc. v. Callidus Software,
Inc., 143 S.W.3d 452, 460 (Tex. App. Austin 2004) (“A covenant not to compete is a
disfavored contract in restraint of trade); Cranston Print Works Co. v. Pothier, 848 A.2d
213, 219 (R.I. 2004) (“It is well settled that covenants not to compete are disfavored and
subject to strict judicial scrutiny”).
7
Bennett, 134 N.W.2d at 898; See also Vortex Protective Serv. v. Dempsey, 463 S.E.2d
67, 69 (Ga. App. 1995) (noting that noncompete agreements injure the employees by
diminishing their ability to make a livelihood and provide for their family); Superior
Consulting Co., Inc. v. Walling, 851 F.Supp. 839, 848 (E.D.Mich.1994) (noting that the
“public policy disfavoring restraints on trade and interference with a person's livelihood
warrants strict examination of noncompetition covenants”); Herring Gas Co., Inc. v.
Whiddon, 616 So.2d 892, 894 (Miss. 1993) (“the law requires a strict construction of
covenants not to compete”).
8
See e.g. Albee Homes, Inc. v. Caddie Homes, Inc., 207 A.2d 768, 772 (Pa.1965)
(restrictive covenants ancillary to an employment contract are subject to a more stringent
test of reasonableness than those ancillary to a buy-sell agreement).
9
Prudential Sec., Inc. v. Plunkett, 8 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519 (E.D. Va. 1998); See
generally, J. W. Looney and Anita K. Poole, Adhesion Contracts, Bad Faith, and
Economically Faulty Contracts, 4 Drake J. Agric. L. 177, 179 (spring 1999) (defining
adhesion contracts as "standard form" contracts offered on a "take it or leave it" basis);
David Sterkin, Challenging Adhesion Contracts in California: A Consumer's Guide 34
Golden Gate U.L.Rev. 285 (spring 2004).
4

As a preliminary matter, a noncompete agreement must, as with all other
contracts, be supported by consideration.10 Issues arise as to consideration when
the noncompete is signed shortly after, but not at or prior to commencement of
employment and also when a noncompete is signed well into an established
employment relationship.
If the noncompete agreement is signed ancillary to the commencement of
employment, the employment itself is sufficient consideration.11 Some
jurisdictions enforce the ancillary requirement strictly and require signing prior to
the commencement of employment12, while other jurisdictions will consider an
agreement ancillary even if signed after the employee begins work.13 In the latter
jurisdictions, the analysis still uses the employee's hiring as the consideration for
the agreement, but the court finds a factual basis for determining that the
employment had not legally commenced or that the noncompete was agreed to
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Moore Business Forms, Inc. v. Wilson, 953 F.Supp. 1056, 1063 (N.D. Iowa 1996)
(holding that because noncompetes are contractual agreements they “they must be
supported by consideration”); NBZ, Inc. v. Pilarski, 520 N.W.2d 93, 96 (Wis. App.
1994)(“restrictive covenants in employment contracts to be supported by consideration”);
RHIS, Inc. v. Boyce, 2001 WL 1192203 at *2 (Del. Ch . 2001) (“[o]f course, a covenant
to compete must be supported by consideration”)
11
Faw, Casson & Co. v. Cranston, 375 A.2d 463, 466 (1977) (“It is generally agreed that
mutual promises of employer and employee furnish valuable considerations each to the
other for the contract”) quoting James C. Greene Co. v. Kelley, 134 S.E.2d 166 (N.C.
1964).
12
Cashman v. National Recruiters, 332 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1982)(Noncompete
agreement presented and signed three days after commencement of employment not
supported by consideration because the employee receives no benefit); C.S.C.S., Inc. v.
Carter, 129 S.W.3d 584, 590 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003) (noncompete signed four days
after the commencement of employment not ancillary)
13
National Business Services v. Wright, 2 F.Supp.2d 701, 707 (E.D.Pa. 1998)
(agreement signed 10 days after starting work considered ancillary because employee
knew of the requirement prior to commencement of employment).
5

prior to commencement of employment, but simply not signed.14 For example, if
an employer and employee have yet to agree on all important terms of
employment, such as pay or commission structure, the court may not consider
employment to have commenced, even though the employee has begun work.15
In other instances, if an employee and employer have agreed on a noncompete
agreement ancillary to employment, consideration will be found even though the
employee does not sign until after commencement.16
If the noncompete agreement is signed after commencement of
employment, jurisdictions are split as to whether additional consideration is
required.17 Those holding that no additional consideration is necessary generally
focus on the fact that the employee could have otherwise been terminated.18

14

Id. at 707.
Van Dyck Printing Company v. DiNicola, 648 A.2d 898, 901 (Conn. Super. 1993),
aff’d, 648 A.2d 877, 878 (Conn.1994) (noting that “because [the trial court’s]
memorandum of decision fully states and meets the arguments raised in the present
appeals, we adopt the trial court's well reasoned decision as a statement of the facts and
the applicable law on these issues. It would serve no useful purpose for us to repeat the
discussion therein contained”).
16
Young v. Mastrom, Inc., 392 S.E.2d 446, 448 (N.C. App. 1990.)(finding a noncompete
agreement signed after commencement of employment to be ancillary, reasoning that “It
is immaterial that the written contract is executed after the employee starts to work.
[citation omitted] However, the terms of a verbal covenant which is later reduced to
writing must have been agreed upon at the time of employment in order for the later
written covenant to be valid and enforceable.”)
17
In Lakeland Employment Group of Columbus v. Columber, 804 N.E.2d 27, 31-32
(Ohio 2004), the Ohio Supreme Court discussed the current divergent approaches to the
issue of whether consideration is required for a noncompete agreement signed after
commencement of employment:
15

Jurisdictions throughout the country are split on the issue presented by the
certified question. See, generally, Annotation, Sufficiency of Consideration for
Employee's Covenant Not to Compete, Entered into after Inception of
Employment (1973), 51 A.L.R.3d 825. As summarized by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, "cases which have held that continued employment is not a sufficient
6

Jurisdictions which require additional consideration19 to support a
noncompete agreement signed after the commencement of employment point to
the fact that the employee receives no benefit as result of signing the agreement
because the employee already has the position and the agreement itself provides
consideration stress the fact that an employee frequently has no bargaining power
once he is employed and can easily be coerced. By signing a noncompetition
agreement, the employee gets no more from his employer than he already
has,[ [FN1]] and in such cases there is a danger that an employer does not need
protection for his investment in the employee but instead seeks to impose barriers
to prevent an employee from securing a better job elsewhere. Decisions in which
continued employment has been deemed a sufficient consideration for a
noncompetition agreement have focused on a variety of factors, including the
possibility that the employee would otherwise have been discharged, the
employee was actually employed for a substantial time after executing the
contract, or the employee received additional compensation or training or was
given confidential information after he signed the agreement." (Citations
omitted.) Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies (Minn. 1980) 298 N.W.2d 127,
130. [footnote omitted]
18
Camco, Inc. v. Baker, 936 P.2d 829, 832 (Nev.1997). (“Today we adopt the majority
rule which states that an at-will employee's continued employment is sufficient
consideration for enforcing a non-competition agreement.”). The Camco court further
reasoned that: “There is "no substantive difference between the promise of employment
upon initial hire and the promise of continued employment subsequent to 'day one.'"
quoting Copeco, Inc. v. Caley, 632 N.E.2d 1299, 1301 (Ohio App. 1992). The Camco
court further noted that a “ contrary holding might leave the employer in a position of
having to fire an at-will employee and then rehire that same employee with the restrictive
covenant in place, or have the covenant held unenforceable for want of consideration.”
936 P.2d at 832.
See also, Compass Bank v. Hartley, 430 F.Supp.2d 973, 978 (D. Ariz 2006) ("the
promise of continued employment validates a covenant executed after employment
commences"); Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 406 A.2d 1310, 1312 (N.H. 1979);
Daughtry v. Capital Gas Co., 229 So.2d 480 (Ala. 1969); Faw, Casson & Co. v.
Cranston, 375 A.2d 463 (Del.Ch.1977); M. S. Jacobs & Associates v. Duffley, 303 A.2d
921 (Penn.1973); Ehlers v. Iowa Warehouse Co., 188 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1971); Farm
Bureau Service Co. v. Kohls, 203 N.W.2d 209 (Iowa 1972).
19
See generally Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 541(Wyo.
1993)(debating the choice between finding continued employment furnishes the required
consideration and requiring additional consideration and holding that requiring additional
consideration “recognizes the increasing criticism of the at-will relationship, the usually
unequal bargaining power of the parties, and the reality that the employee rarely
‘bargains for’ continued employment in exchange for a potentially onerous restraint on
the ability to earn a living”)
7

no benefit.20 Those jurisdictions reject the notion that continued employment
alone can support a noncompete agreement, finding any claimed consideration to
be “illusory”21 since the employer retained the right to terminate the employee at
any time.22 These jurisdictions will look for an intangible benefit to support the
agreement, such as "increased wages, a promotion, a bonus, a fixed term of
employment, or perhaps access to protected information." 23 In still other
jurisdictions, courts will look to the specific employment relationship after the
signing and allow factors such as a promotion or lengthy employment history to
provide the consideration.24

20

See generally Cashman v. National Recruiters, 332 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1982)
(Holding that a noncompete agreement presented and signed three days after
commencement of employment not supported by consideration because the employee
receives no benefit); Poole v. Incentives Unlimited, Inc., 548 S.E.2d 207, 209(S.C. 2001)
(holding that there is “no consideration when the contract containing the covenant is
exacted after several years employment and the employee's duties and position are left
unchanged”); Cox v. Dine-A-Mate, Inc., 501 S.E.2d 353, 356 (N.C. App. 1998) (finding
no consideration where the “plaintiff received no change in compensation, commission,
duties, nature of employment or other consideration in exchange for signing the
employment agreement, but rather that he signed it to keep his job”).
21
Poole v. Incentives Unlimited, Inc., 525 S.E.2d 898, 900 (S.C. App. 1999).
22
Id.
23
Labriola v. Pollard Group, Inc., 100 P.3d 791, 799 (Wash. 2004).
24
See Lakeland, 804 N.E.2d at 31:
More recently, some courts have found sufficient consideration in an atwill employment situation where a substantial period of employment
ensues after a noncompetition covenant is executed, especially when the
continued employment is accompanied by raises, promotion, or similar
tangible benefits. 6 Lord, Williston on Contracts (4th Ed.1995), Section
13:13. These courts thereby implicitly find that the execution of a
noncompetition agreement changes the prior employment relationship
from one purely at will. Id. at 577-584. In effect, these courts infer a
promise on the part of the employer to continue the employment of his
previously at-will employee for an indefinite yet substantial term. Under
this approach, however, neither party knows whether the agreement is
enforceable until events occur after its execution.”

8

The above principles are malleable enough that a court can use them to
find consideration even when strict contract principles would otherwise lead to an
alternative conclusion. One such example is the Connecticut Supreme Court case
of Van Dyck Printing Company v. DiNicola.25 Connecticut is a state that requires
that the noncompete agreement be signed ancillary to the commencement of
employment or additional consideration is needed.26 In Van Dyck, the employee
was hired by the employer as a printing salesman, a new career for the
employee.27 Prior to starting work, the parties orally agreed that the employee
would receive $150 draw against commission, a 7% commission for sales up to
$100,000, and a higher, undetermined, rate for total sales above $100,000.28 The
parties agreed that eventually a contract would be written up and would include a
noncompete agreement.29 Four weeks after the employee commenced work, he
signed an employment agreement which included a noncompete agreement and
See also Lawrence and Allen, Inc. v. Cambridge Human Resource Group, Inc.,
685 N.E.2d 434, 441 (Ill. App. 2 Dist. 1997) (“Continued employment for a
substantial period of time is sufficient consideration to support an employment
agreement.”) citing McRand, Inc. v. Van Beelen, 486 N.E.2d 1306 (1985); Curtis
1000, Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 945 (C.A.7 (Ill.) 1994) (finding consideration for
a noncompete signed after commencement of employment because employee
worked for eight years after signing).
25
648 A.2d 898, 901 (Conn. Super. 1993), aff’d, 648 A.2d 877, 878 (Conn. 1994)
(noting that “because [the trial court’s] memorandum of decision fully states and meets
the arguments raised in the present appeals, we adopt the trial court's well reasoned
decision as a statement of the facts and the applicable law on these issues. It would serve
no useful purpose for us to repeat the discussion therein contained).
26
Artman v. Output Technologies Solutions Eastern Region, Inc., 2000 WL 992166
(Conn.Super.). The Van Dyck court distinguished the facts of its case from those of a
situation where employment had commenced and the employee was asked to sign a
noncompete agreement one year after beginning work; in that situation, there was no
consideration for the contract. Van Dyck, 648 A.2d at 901.
27
Van Dyck, at 900.
28
Id.
29
Id.
9

provided slightly higher than 7% for sales of between $25,000 and $75,000 and
an 8.5% commission on sales over $75,000.30 The employee worked for the
employer for nearly 20 years, after which he left to begin his own company and
within a week was calling on his former customers.31
The Connecticut Supreme Court found consideration, theorizing that the
open terms in the oral agreement meant that the parties really had not agreed and,
therefore, employment had not commenced.32 The court rationalized that "the
fact of [employee’s] presence at work [did] not" signify an employment
relationship.33 The court further noted that there was some sort of agreement that
the employer would be "protected."34 Additionally, the court reasoned that even
if employment was to be construed as having commenced, the enhanced
commission rate would constitute new consideration for the covenant not to
compete.35

30

Id.
Id. at 901.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. The fine line that courts walk in differentiating between consideration and no
consideration is also demonstrated in a pair of Minnesota Supreme Court decisions,
Davies v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1980) and Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 334.
N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 1983). In both, employees signed noncompete agreements after the
commencement of employment and neither receive money or other tangible assets at the
time of signing. Davies, 298 N.W.2d at 129 ; Freeman, 334. N.W.2d at 628 In Davies,
the employer argued that consideration existed because the employee was promoted from
clerk to salesperson and received training as a result of signing the noncompete
agreement. Davies, 298 N.W.2d at 129. In Freeman, the employer argued that
consideration existed because the employee, a doctor who was also a shareholder in the
clinic, benefited since the clinic was strengthened due to the majority of physicians
signing the agreements. Freeman, 334 N.W.2d at 630. The Davies court found
consideration, while the Freeman court did not. Davies, 298 N.W.2d at 131; Freeman,
334. N.W.2d at 630. In both cases the court looked at how similarly situated employees
31
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III. Analysis of the Noncompete Agreement
Once consideration is found, the court will analyze several components to
determine if the noncompete agreement is to be upheld.36 First, the court must determine
if the employer has a legitimate business interest that may be protected by a noncompete
agreement. If the employer has a legitimate business interest, the court must then
determine whether the noncompete agreement is reasonable in terms of time, geography,
and prohibited activities.37

fared. In Davies, a brother of the employee in the family owned business (owned by their
father), refused to sign a noncompete agreement and remained a clerk. Davies, 298
N.W.2d at 131. In Freeman, the few doctors who refused to sign were not punished in
any way and all doctors, whether they signed or not, receive the same fringe benefits and
were compensated under the same pay scale. Freeman, 334 N.W.2d at 630.
36
Unger v. FFW Corp., 771 N.E.2d 1240, 1245 (Ind. App. 2002). The Unger court set
forth the basic process of analyzing noncompete agreements:
“‘In determining the reasonableness of the covenant not to compete, we examine
whether the employer has asserted a legitimate interest that may be protected by a
covenant.’ Id. If the employer has asserted a legitimate, protectible interest, we
determine whether the scope of the agreement is reasonable in terms of time,
geography, and types of activity prohibited. ‘The employer bears the burden of
showing that the covenant is reasonable and necessary in light of the
circumstances.’ The employer must demonstrate that ‘the former employee has
gained a unique competitive advantage or ability to harm the employer before
such employer is entitled to the protection of a noncompetition covenant.’”
Id. at 1244 (citations omitted); see also C & L Industries, Inc. v. Kiviranta, 698 N.W.2d
240, 250 (Neb. App. 2005) (noting that the Nebraska Supreme court test is to consider:
"the degree of inequality in bargaining power; the risk of the covenantee losing customers;
the extent of respective participation by the parties in securing and retaining customers;
the good faith of the covenantee; the existence of sources or general knowledge
pertaining to the identity of customers; the nature and extent of the business position held
by the covenantor; the covenantor's training, health, education, and needs of his [or her]
family; the current conditions of employment; the necessity of the covenantor changing
his [or her] calling or residence; and the correspondence of the restraint with the need for
protecting the legitimate interests of the covenantee.").
37
Id. There are two other factors that are often noted by courts: whether the agreement is
injurious to the public and a balancing of the harms between the employer’s legitimate
interest and the harshness to the employee. If a court finds that either of these factors
11

weighs against enforcement, then the noncompete is void and the analysis in this article is
not applicable. See generally Gillespie v. Carbondale and Marion Eye Centers, Ltd., 251
Ill.App.3d 625, 626 (5th Dist.1993) (“In determining the enforceability of covenants not
to compete… courts have focused on numerous factors, including whether enforcement
of the contract would be injurious to the public”); Kallok v. Medtronic, Inc., 573 N.W.2d
356, 361 (Minn.1998) (“In determining whether to enforce a particular noncompete
agreement or provision, the court balances the employer's interest in protection from
unfair competition against the employee's right to earn a livelihood”); Chambers-Dobson,
Inc. v. Squier, 472 N.W.2d 39, 400 (Neb. 1991)(noting that the “harshness and
oppressiveness on the covenantor-employee is weighed against protection of a valid
business interest of the covenantee-employer”).
As to the public policy considerations, while, as noted above, courts disfavor
noncompete agreements, see supra, note 6 and accompanying text, most courts will
uphold a noncompete agreement if it protects an employer’s legitimate business interest
and is reasonable as to temporal and geographic limitations and as to the scope of the
preclusions. See infra notes 76-112 and accompanying text. The public policy analysis
is most prominent in cases involving physicians. See e.g. Valley Med. Specialists v.
Farber, 982 P.2d 1277,1284 (Ariz. 1999) (“[a]lthough stopping short of banning
restrictive covenants between physicians, the American Medical Association ("AMA")
"discourages" such covenants, finding they are not in the public interest.”); Ohio Urology,
Inc. v. Poll, 594 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (1991)(noting that the disfavor of noncompete
agreements restricting physicians is particularly strong because it greatly effects the
public); see also Paula Berg, Judicial Enforcement of Covenants not to Compete Between
Physicians: Protecting Doctors' Interests at Patients' Expense, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. 1,6
(1992)(noting that "[f]or the past 60 years, the American Medical Association (AMA) has
consistently taken the position that noncompetition agreements between physicians
impact negatively on patient care."); Serena L. Kafker, Golden Handcuffs:
Enforceability of Noncompetition Clauses in Professional Partnership Agreements of
Accountants, Physicians, and Attorneys, 31 Am. Bus. L.J. 31 (1993); see generally James
W. Lowery, Covenants Not to Compete in Physician Contracts: Recent Trends Defining
Reasonableness at Common Law 24 J. Legal Med. 215 (June 2003); Arthur S. Di Dio The
Legal Implications of Noncompetition Agreements in Physician Contracts 20 J. Legal
Med. 457 (Dec. 1999).
As to most other occupations, a primary factor the court will look at in
determining if a noncompete is injurious to the public is whether the services that will be
precluded are still available to the public. Redd Pest Control Co., Inc. v. Foster, 761
So.2d 967, 973 (Miss. App. 2000)(noting that a noncompete agreement limiting an
employee from providing pest control services was not injurious to the public, nor did it
create a monopoly for the employer, because six or seven other companies were available
in the area).
12

These reasonableness determinations are almost always fact-intensive in nature.38
The determinations are also the focus of the remedy analysis in this article.39 After
reviewing the case law analysis pertaining to the reasonableness factors, this section will
take a brief look at employer-employee state statutes.

A. Legitimate business interest.
Most decisions analyzing noncompete agreements begin with an analysis as to
whether the employer is protecting a legitimate business interest. 40 The purpose of the

38

See Omni-Plex World Services Corporation v. US Investigation Services, Inc., 618
S.E.2d 340, 342 (Va. 2005) (“Each non-competition agreement must be evaluated on its
own merits, balancing the provisions of the contract with the circumstances of the
businesses and employees involved”).
39
See infra notes 119-154 and accompanying text.
40
Weber v. Tillman 913 P.2d 84 (Kan. 1996) (the four factors a court must examine in
determining enforceability a noncompete are whether the contract protects a legitimate
business interest, imposes an undue burden on the employee or injures the public, the
reasonableness of the geographic and time restrictions) See also A. Scott McDonald,
Noncompete Contracts: Understanding the Cost of Unpredictability, 10 Tex. Wesleyan
L. Rev. 137 (Fall 2003). McDonald notes that among the recognized protectable interests
for employers are:
“ reasonable restraints designed:
(1) to protect trade secrets and confidential information of the company;
(2) to protect customer goodwill developed for the company (customer
relationships);
(3) to protect overall business goodwill and assets that have been sold
(noncompetes used in the sale of a business);
(4) to protect unique and specialized training;
(5) for situations in which the employer has contracted for the services of an
individual of unique value because of who they are (e.g., performers, professional
athletes); and
(6) for pinnacle employees in charge of an organization.
Id. at 143 (and accompanying footnotes);
Wisc. Stat. 103.465 (2002). Restrictive covenants in employment contracts
A covenant by an assistant, servant or agent not to compete with his or her
employer or principal during the term of the employment or agency, or after the
13

noncompete agreement cannot be to simply make it more difficult for the employee to
leave;41 rather, the agreement must protect a legitimate business purpose for the
employer.42 Further, an employer does not have legitimate interest in protecting against
ordinary competition. As one court put it, to prevail an employer must show that:
"without the covenant, the employee would gain an unfair advantage in future
competition with the employer.”43
The ways in which an employer may acquire a legitimate business interest in
restraining an employee through a noncompete agreement can be roughly grouped into
three categories: through an investment in training, by giving the employee access to
trade secrets, and by the employee creating goodwill with customers. Of these, the final
category is the most common.
1. Training. The court will look to see if the employer has invested time and
money training the employee and the extent and type of training. If the training consists
of routine training that is widely available or that takes minimal time or expense, then the

termination of that employment or agency, within a specified territory and during a
specified time is lawful and enforceable only if the restrictions imposed are
reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer or principal. Any covenant,
described in this subsection, imposing an unreasonable restraint is illegal, void and
unenforceable even as to any part of the covenant or performance that would be a
reasonable restraint.
41
Allen, Gibbs & Houlik, L.C. v. Ristow, 94 P.3d 724, 726 (Kan. App. 2004); Unger,
771 N.E.2d 1240 at 1244 (“To show a legitimate protectible interest, ‘an employer must
show some reason why it would be unfair to allow the employee to compete with the
former employer.’" quoting Titus v. Rheitone, Inc., 758 N.E.2d 85, 92 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001)).
42
Compass Bank v. Hartley, 430 F.Supp.2d 973, 978 (D. Ariz 2006) (“A covenant not to
compete is generally enforceable as long as it is no broader than necessary to protect an
employer's legitimate business interests”); Caring Hearts Personal Home Services, Inc. v.
Hobley, 130 P.3d 1215 (Kan. App. 2006) (“only legitimate business interests may be
protected by a noncompete agreement”).
43
Vantage Technology, LLC v. Cross, 17 S.W.3d 637, 644 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)
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employer probably does not have a legitimate business interest in the training.44 An
employer also does not have a legitimate business interest in protecting against the use of
generally available training.45 Additionally, “[i]n determining the legitimacy of the
interest the employer seeks to protect, the court will take into account the employee's
time46 and monetary investment47 in the employee's skills and development of his
craft."48 Further, an employer only has a protectable interest in restraining an employee's
unique knowledge and skills which were obtained through training with the employer.49
So, if the employer spends several weeks or months training an employee on the
employer's own technical products, it probably has a legitimate business interest to
protect.50

44

Id. at 645; 7’s Enterprises, Inc., v. Del Rosario, 143 P.3d 23, 31 (Haw. 2006) (noting
that “[s]pecialized or unique training, as distinguished from general skills” is a
protectable)
45
See Moore Business Forms, Inc. v. Foppiano, 382 S.E.2d 499, 502 (W. Va. 1989):
"[w]hen the skills and information acquired by a former employee are of a general
managerial nature, such as supervisory, merchandising, purchasing and advertising
skills and information, a restrictive covenant in an employment contract will not be
enforced because such skills and information are not protectible employer interests."
46
See also Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Burnett, 146 N.W.2d 320 (Iowa 1967) (enforcing
noncompetition agreement where employee had been given eight weeks training in
exterminating insects and methods of operation).
47
See also Dain Bosworth Inc. v. Brandhorst, 356 N.W.2d 590, 593-94 (Iowa
App.1984)($20,000 training investment created a legitimate business interest).
48
Brunswick Floors, Inc. v. Guest. 506 S.E.2d 670, 673 (Ga. App. 1998) quoting
Beckman v. Cox Broadcasting Corp., 296 S.E.2d 566 (Ga. 1982).
49
Vantage Technology, 17 S.W.3d at 645 (“whether an employer has a protectable
interest in its investment in training an employee depends on whether the skill acquired as
a result of that training is sufficiently special as to make a competing use of it by the
employee unfair.”); see also Brentlinger Enterprises v. Curran, 752 N.E.2d 994, 1002
(Ohio App. 10 Dist. 2001) (one factor to consider in determining reasonableness of a
noncompete is whether the agreement will stifle pre-existing skills).
50
Vantage Technology, 17 S.W.3d at 645; compare 7’s Enterprises, Inc., v. Del Rosario,
143 P.3d 23, 32 (Haw. 2006) (evidence that the sales training included “something
secret” and that the training was specifically designed and solely developed by employer
over a number of years and was not being utilized by other companies sufficient to create
15

An example of the type of unique training which will create a legitimate business
interest can be found in Aero Kool Corp. v. Oosthuizen51. In Aero, the employee had no
prior experience in aviation repair when he was hired by the employer, an aviation repair
company.52 The employer provided him 195 hours of training, which allowed him to be
certified by the FAA.53 After failing a drug test, the employee was fired and then hired
shortly thereafter by the employer’s competitor. 54 The appellate court reversed the trial
court’s denial of the employer’s request for a temporary injunction, noting that the
employee had no prior experience and received certification by the FAA due to the
training.55
2. Trade secrets / confidential information. Noncompete agreement analysis
occasionally crosses over with analysis of a confidentiality agreement protecting trade
secrets. This term is oftentimes used loosely by courts in noncompete agreement analysis
to refer to items such as customer lists and methods of operation which may or may not
be considered "trade secrets" under laws regulating trade secrets.56 Of course, if the

a legitimate business interest) with Moore Business Forms, 382 S.E.2d at 501-02 (no
legitimate business interest when training not unique or specialized to the company and
the information disseminated was readily available to competitiors).
51
736 So.2d 25 (Fla. 3d Dist. App. 1999)
52
Id. at 25.
53
Id. at 25-26
54
Id. at 26.
55
Id. The Aero court distinguished the case of Austin v. Mid State Fire Equip. of Central
Florida, 727 So.2d 1097 (Fla. 5th Dist. App. 1999), where an employee already had
extensive industry experience prior to being hired and had not received any specialized
knowledge from the employer.
56
See generally Markovits v. Venture Info Capital, Inc., 129 F.Supp.2d 647, 657
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“A trade secret is any formula or combination of information that is
used in business and gives its owner a competitive advantage over others in the
marketplace who do not have access to it.”).
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employee is under a confidentiality agreement, the employee cannot disclose the trade
secrets, whether a noncompete agreement is in place.57
An example of “trade secret” analysis in the context of a noncompete agreement
can be found in Bed Mart, Inc v. Kelley58, in which the employee had access to the access
to the company's "Product Bible," which contained information about all the merchandise
in the stores and the wholesale prices of those items, as well promotional deals from
suppliers.59 In reversing the trial court’s decision that a six month restriction was
unreasonable, the court reasoned in part that the “Product Bible” was updated every six
months, so the employee would have a competitive advantage were he to go to work for a
competitor while the book was still valid.60
3. Customer Contacts. The most common way a legitimate business interest is
created is through the employee’s contact with customers. This line of analysis, also
referred to as protecting the employer's "goodwill," focuses on the relationship between
the employee and the employer's customers. As one court stated: “’good will’” is broader,
than simply the names, addresses and requirements of customers, or some pricing
information, it also includes the advantageous familiarity and personal contact that
employees, …, derive from their dealings with the employer's customers.”61 To
determine if an employee’s customer contacts are sufficient to create a legitimate
business interest for the employer, courts look to see if the employee has become the face

57

See generally Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements
Enforceable? 25 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 627 (1999) (Discussing confidentiality
agreements in the context of tobacco litigation).
58
45 P.3d 1219 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 2002)
59
Id. at 1222.
60
Id. at 1223.
61
Standard Register Co. v. Cleaver, 30 F.Supp.2d 1084, 1094 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
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of the company in the minds of the employer's customers.62 Perhaps the most common
example is the outside salesperson who visits customers at their work places.63 In this
situation, the employee is likely to be the only real contact between the employer and the
customer.64
In determining if an employer has a legitimate business interest to protect under
this category, courts will look at the nature and extent of the contact between the
employee and they customer, and also the type of product being delivered.65 Particularly
in a situation where the employer’s products are similar to others in the marketplace,
“[t]he possibility is present that the customer will regard, or come to regard, the attributes
of the employee as more important in his business dealings than any special qualities of
the product or service of the employer.”66
Once it is determined that the employer has a legitimate interest to protect, the
next issue is whether the limitations on the employee as to the potential customers the
62

Vantage Technology, 17 S.W.3d at 645.
See e.g. Standard Register, 30 F.Supp.2d at 1088 (salesperson/ business forms); SafetyKleen Systems, Inc. v. Hennkens, 301 F.3d 931, 933 (C.A.8 2002) (customer rep “only
normal contact” with the customer); Wright Medical Technology, Inc. v. Somers, 37
F.Supp.2d 673, 674 (D.N.J. 1999)(medical sales representative).
64
See e.g. North American Products Corp. v. Moore, 196 F.Supp.2d 1217 (M.D.Fla.
2002) (in a case involving a sales representative, court noted that “an employer has a
legitimate business interest in prohibiting solicitation of its customers with whom the
employee has a substantial relationship”); American Fidelity Assurance Corp. v.
Leonard, 81 F.Supp.2d 1115, 1120 (D.Kan. 2000) (upholding agreement where the
employee representative was sole contact with the customer).
65
Standard Register Co., 30 F.Supp.2d at 1095-96. The court also noted that “in
industries where personal contact between the employee and customer are especially
important due to similarity in the product offered by competitors, the advantage acquired
through the employee's representative contact with customers is part of the employer's
good will, irrespective of whether or not the employee had access to confidential
information.” Id. at 1095 quoting Field v. Alexander & Alexander of Indiana, Inc. 503
N.E.2d 627, 633 (Ind. App. 1987).
66
C & L Industries, Inc. v. Kiviranta, 698 N.W.2d 240, 248 (Neb. App. 2005) quoting
American Sec. Servs. v. Vodra, 385 N.W.2d 73, 78 (Neb. 1986).
63
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employee may contact and the types of positions the employee may accept during the
tolling of the noncompete are reasonable. The court also must determine whether the
temporal and geographic limitations in the noncompete agreement are reasonable.
B. Reasonableness of Limitations on Customer Contact and Employment Positions
Of course, simply because an employer has a legitimate business interest to
protect does not mean the employer may broadly preclude the employee from any type of
competition. The agreement must be narrowly tailored to preclude only those positions
and customer contacts necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate business interests.67
Agreements may be found to be overly broad when the employer seeks to
preclude the employee from any position that competes with the employer, even if
dissimilar to the employee’s duties with the employer. For example, a noncompete
agreement precluding a dentist from competing with his former employer in both oral
surgery and general dentistry was unreasonably broad because the dentist only practiced
oral surgery with the employer.68 Similarly, a noncompete agreement precluding a truck
parts sales person from working "in any capacity ... whatsoever ... in any business
activities ... competitive with those of [the employer]" was overly broad as the employer
had interests beyond the area in which the employee sold.69

67

Lawrence and Allen, Inc. v. Cambridge Human Resource Group, Inc., 685 N.E.2d 434,
442 (Ill. App. 2 Dist. 1997) (“Activity restrictions, like restrictions on competing or
soliciting, should be narrowly tailored to protect only against activities that threaten the
employer's interest.”); Concord Orthopaedics Professional Ass'n v. Forbes, 702 A.2d
1273, 1276 (N.H. 1997) (holding that a noncompete agreement must be narrowly tailored
“to encompass only legitimate interests of the employer”).
68
Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751, 754 (N.Y. App. 1971). This is an example of a
noncompete agreement term which is “severable,” as discussed infra notes 131-142 and
accompanying text.
69
McNeilus Companies, Inc. v. Sam, 971 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997); see
also Motion Control Systems, Inc. v. East, 546 S.E.2d 424, 426 (Va. 2001) (finding a
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Since employers are generally most concerned with protecting customer
relationships, a common issue in noncompete agreement litigation is whether the
agreement reasonably defines which customers the employee may not solicit. Generally,
the employer must be careful to narrowly limit the customer preclusion.70
Noncompete agreements which preclude the employee from contacting any of the
employer’s are usually found unreasonable; the preclusion must generally be limited to
only the customers who dealt with the employee.71 Also, it is generally unreasonable to
preclude the employee from contacting former clients.72 However, it may even be

noncompete agreement overly broad when the employer defined a "similar business" as "
any business that designs, manufactures, sells or distributes motors, motor drives or
motor controls," which the court found "could include a wide range of enterprises
unrelated to" the employer’s business); Ken's Stereo Video Junction, Inc. v. Plotner,
560 S.E.2d 708, 710 (Ga. App. 2002) (finding a noncompete agreement overly broad
when it precluded a car stereo and security system installer from working for a
competitor in any capacity, even as a janitor); Harville v. Gunter, 495 S.E.2d 862, 864
(Ga. App.1998) (finding it unreasonable to prohibit a speech pathologist from being an
officer or director of a company engaged in speech pathology because being an officer or
director is markedly different than being a speech pathologist); Pathfinder
Communications Corp. v. Macy, 795 N.E.2d 1103,1114 (Ind. App. 2003) (finding
unreasonable a term in the noncompete agreement with a former employee, a radio disc
jockey, holding that he "will not engage in activities," at a competing station as being
unreasonably broad because it extended far beyond the employer’s interests and
employee as a disc jockey).
70
See e.g. Product Action International, Inc. v. Mero, 277 F.Supp.2d 919, 926 (S.D. Ind.
2003) (finding noncompete provision unreasonable where it “fails to impose any
reasonable limit in terms … customers”)
71
See Advance Technology Consultants, Inc. v. Roadtrac, LLC, 551 S.E.2d 735, 738
(Ga. App. 2001) (finding a noncompete agreement to be overly broad where it precluded
the employee from contacting any of the employer’s customers, even those with whom
the employee never worked); Professional Business Services Co. v. Rosno, 680 N.W.2d
176, 186-87 (Neb. 2004) (unreasonable to prohibit former employee from soliciting
customers of employer with whom the employee did not have substantial or any personal
contact); DCS Sanitation Management, Inc. v. Casillo, 435 F.3d 892, 898 (C.A.8. 2006)
(finding overbroad a term precluding former employee from soliciting any customer
“having business dealings” with the employer).
72
Philip G. Johnson & Co. v. Salmen, 317 N.W.2d 900, 904 (Neb. 1982) (a former
employer “certainly can have [no interest] in its former clients”); Equity Enterprises, Inc.
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reasonable to preclude the employee from contacting current customers, if those
customers pre-existed the employment relationship.73 Finally, precluding an employee
from contacting the employer’s potential customers will most often be held
unreasonable.74
C. Reasonableness of the Temporal Limitation
All noncompete agreements have, or should have, a specific time after which the
agreement expires.75 Once again, the court will carefully scrutinize this term to ensure
that it is reasonable. And, once again, what is reasonable is fact intensive based upon the
employee and the industry.
In analyzing whether a certain temporal limitation is reasonable, courts generally
look at two factors:
1. The time necessary to hire and train a replacement; and
2. The time necessary to obliterate the connection between the customer and the
departing employee. 76

v. Milosch, 633 N.W.2d 662, 670 (Wis. App. 2001) (finding unreasonable a noncompete
term which prohibited former employee from contact with any customer of employer
whom employee serviced at "any time" during his employment; the restriction would
prohibit employee from doing business with a customer he serviced during the first
weeks of his 15-year employment) Rosno, 680 N.W.2d at 186-87 (unreasonable to
prohibit former employee from soliciting former customers of employer).
73
Prairie Eye Center, Ltd. v. Butler, 713 N.E.2d 610 (Ill. App. 4.Dist. 1999).
74
Freiburger v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 111 P.3d 100, 107 (Idaho 2005) (find a
noncompete agreement overly broad, in part, because it precluded employee from
soliciting “pending” customers)
75
See generally Diversified Fastening Systems, Inc. v. Rogge, 786 F.Supp. 1486, 1492
(N.D.Iowa1991) (“The failure to limit the time period and geographical restriction
essentially make the contract one imposing a restrictive covenant of unlimited time and
space. Such an unlimited covenant is clearly unreasonable and unenforceable.”); but see
C.T. Dreschler, Enforceability of Restrictive Covenant, Ancillary to Employment
Contract, As Affected by Duration of Restriction, 41 A.L.R.2d 15 (1955) (listing cases
purporting to support the notion that the lack of a time limitation does not render the
noncompete agreement ipso facto unenforceable).
76
Davies v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Minn. 1980)
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In short, the employer should be returned to its whole status before the departing
employee is allowed to help a competitor.77 Most often both of the above factors are
considered when determining the reasonableness of the time restriction because most
contested noncompete agreements involve employees with customer contacts.
Noncompetes may be, however, upheld as to employees without customer contacts.
Most courts will look for an employee whose services are “'special, unique or
extraordinary' and not merely of 'high value to his employer,'”78 Also, it generally must
be shown that the employee’s services are “of such character as to make his replacement
impossible or that the loss of such services would cause the employer irreparable
injury.”79 In Parma International, Inc. v. Bartos80, the employee provided the company
with special designs and improvements in the manufacturing of model cars.81

In

upholding a one year restriction, the court also noted that the employee was also
instrumental in taking the company from a cottage industry to five million dollar per year
in revenues over the employee’s six years.82
However, the more common point of analysis, especially positions that would
reasonably require a noncompete agreement, is that of the amount of time necessary for
the new employee to reasonably replace the departing employee in the minds of the

77

See Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 194 Ariz. 363, 982 P.2d 1277,1284 (1999)(“An
employer may also have a legitimate interest in having a "reasonable amount of time to
overcome the former employee's loss, usually by hiring a replacement and giving that
replacement time to establish a working relationship.") quoting Harlan M. Blake,
Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 62 (1960)).
78
Brentlinger Enterprises v. Curran, 752 N.E.2d 994, 1002 (Ohio App. 10 Dist. 2001)
quoting Parma Internatl., Inc. v. Bartos, 1990 WL 11716 (Ohio App. 9 Dist. 1990);
79
Brentlinger, 752 N.E.2d 994 at 1002.
80
1990 WL 11716 ((Ohio App. 9th Dist. Feb. 7, 1990)
81
Id. at *3
82
Id. at *2
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customers. This is a fact-intensive analysis, as demonstrated in Standard Register Co. v.
Cleaver.83
In Standard, the employee sold business forms and specialty printing items. Prior
to commencing employment he signed a noncompete precluding him from selling to the
employer’s customers for two years after the employment relationship ended.84 The
employee developed close relationships with his customers and visited major customers
every two weeks, regardless of their ordering schedule.85 The employee was generally
the sole contact with the customer.86 Soon after the employment relationship ended, the
employee began selling for a competitor in his former territory.87
The court framed the temporal limitation legal issue as: "After what period of
time will the customer cease to be influenced by the personal relationship the employee
was able to establish while in the employ of his employer?"88 The court noted that, in
making this determination, the court will look at the regularity and frequency of the
contacts between the employee and the customer.89 If the employee has frequent contacts
with the customer, a shorter duration will be necessary to replace the employee, assuming
the new employee commences with a similar visitation schedule.90
Since the employee in Standard made very frequent visits to his customers, at first
blush it would seem that two years would be an unreasonable restraint. However, the
court upheld the two year restriction, relying on two points of analysis. First, the visits
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

30 F.Supp.2d at 1095
Id. at 1090
Id. at 1089.
Id. at 1090.
Id. at 1091.
Id. at 1098.
Id.
Id.
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themselves could be characterized as progressive, as the employee learned more and
more on each visit about how the customer's business was organized, the key personnel,
and even through socializing events.91 Secondly, major customers oftentimes used a "test
order" process in which the employee had to get to know the customer's business and the
customer determined if it to would take the product, a process which usually took several
months.92 Thus, even though the employee's contact with the customer was frequent and
regular, two years was a reasonable restriction because the new employee would have to
make several visits to acquire the knowledge and understanding of the customer's
business to truly replace the departing employee, especially in an industry where the
difference between competing projects was "razor thin" and the knowledge of and
relationship with the customer was key to the employer's success.93
D. Reasonableness of the Geographic Limitation
A noncompete agreement also usually includes a limitation on where the
employee may seek employment.94 As with the temporal limitation analysis, the
determination of whether a geographic limitation is reasonable is fact intensive.95 The
general rule is that the “contractual prohibitions must be geographically limited to what is

91

Id.
Id.
93
Id. at 1096.
94
See generally C.T. Drechsler, Enforceability ofRestrictive Covenant, Ancillary to
Employment Contract, as Affected by Territorial Extent of Restriction, 43 A.L.R.2d 94
(1955).
95
Wausau Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Magda, 366 F.Supp.2d 212, 220 (D. Me. 2005) ("the
reasonableness of a noncompetition covenant…must be determined by the facts
developed in each case as to its duration, geographic area").
92
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reasonably necessary to protect the employer's business.”96 The geographic limitation is
written either as an actual geographic “line”97 or in terms of customers.98
A traditional geographic limitation simply precludes the employee from working
in a particular county or state or mile radius.99 In determining reasonableness, there is,
however, a focus on customers.100 For example in Herring Gas Co., Inc. v. Magee101, a
propane salesman was precluded from working within fifty miles of both existing and
future locations.102 In limiting the noncompete to only those locations in existence at the
time the employment relationship ended, the court noted that “The primary right of the
employer is that of protecting the business from loss of customers by the activities of the
former employees who have peculiar knowledge of and relationships with the employer's
customers.’”103 The court reasoned that no such knowledge could be acquired outside of

96

Wolf v. Colonial Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 420 S.E.2d 217, 222 (S.C. App. 1992)
See e.g. Deming v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 905 A.2d 623, 637 (Conn. 2006) (25 mile
radius); Maine Eye Care Associates P.A. v. Gorman, 890 A.2d 707, 709 (Me. 2006) (30
mile radius); Jenkins v. Eckerd Corp., 913 So.2d 43, 53-54 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 2005) (five
square miles); King v. Head Start Family Hair Salons, Inc., 886 So.2d 769, 770) (Ala.
2004) (two mile radius).
98
Wolf, 420 S.E.2d 217 at 222 (“Prohibitions against contacting existing customers can
be a valid substitute for a geographic limitation”).
99
Camco, Inc. v. Baker, 936 P.2d 829, 834 (Nev.1997) (noncompete agreement
prohibiting former management employees from competing with employer within 50
miles of any location in which employer has targeted expansion to be too broad, noting
that "[t]o be reasonable, the territorial restriction should be limited to the territory in
which appellants [ (former employers) ] established customer contacts and good will."
citing Weatherford Oil and Tool Co. v. Campbell, 327 S.W.2d 76, 77 (Tex.Civ.App.1959)
(holding geographical restriction "in any area where [employer] may be operating or
carrying on business" void as unlimited as to territory).
100
See Stringer v. Herron, 424 S.E.2d 547, 548 (Ct. App. S.C. 1992)(Fifteen mile radius
restriction held unreasonable when an “overwhelming majority” of employer’s clients
lived much closer than fifteen miles from business)
101
813 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Miss. 1993).
102
Id. at 1245.
103
Id.
97
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the areas surrounding existing employer locations.104 A geographic limitation based on a
specific county or state line or mile radius is the easiest to analyze and is more likely to
be seen as reasonable when the business is one in which the customers seek out the
business.105
On the other hand, some employment situations, particularly those in which the
employee seeks out and/or visits the customer, do not lend themselves to a clear-cut
traditional geographic limitation. In many such situations, the so-called geographic
limitation is written in terms of customers.106 For example, the noncompete may be
drafted to preclude the employee not from a specific mile radius or other geographic
boundary, but in terms of not contacting former customers.107 In Wolf v. Colonial Life
and Acc. Ins. Co., the noncompete precluded the employee insurance agent from
contacting existing policy holders and accounts.108 The employee argued that this
effectively precluded him from customers throughout the country. The court reasoned

104

Id.
Unger v. FFW Corp., 771 N.E.2d 1240, 1245 (Ind. App. 2002) (Bank employee’s
noncompete agreement reasonable when it extends to the county where the bank is
located and to the immediately surrounding counties, as it is not unusual for a bank to
have customers from an adjacent county) but see Klick v. Crosstown State Bank of Ham
Lake, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Minn. App. 1985) (Noncompete unenforceable when
bank employee has no special relationships with customers).
106
See Robert S. Weiss and Associates, Inc. v. Wiederlight, 546 A.2d 216, 220 (Conn.
1988) (lack of a specific geographic limitation acceptable when noncompete agreement
precluded employee from soliciting employer’s existing accounts for two years);
Norlund v. Faust, 675 N.E.2d 1142, 1155 (Ind. App.1997) ("The use of territorial
boundaries is only one method of limiting a covenant's scope, and when a covenant not to
compete contains a restraint which clearly defines a class of persons with whom contact
is prohibited, the need for a geographical restraint is decreased.").
107
Crown It Services, Inc. v. Koval-Olsen, 782 N.Y.S.2d 708 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. 2004).
108
Wolf, 420 S.E.2d at 222.
105
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that this was appropriate, as the employer did business nationwide and therefore needed
such broad protection.109
As with the temporal limitation, the reasonableness of a customer-list
“geographic” limitation is very fact intensive and raises interesting questions as to the
limits of such a restriction.110 Should the employee be precluded from contacting former
customers who no longer were active at the time employment terminated? Or how about
potential customers the employee was currently soliciting but had not yet successfully
sold?111 As to the latter, it's the employee is marketing a line of generally available
products, then the employee probably cannot reasonably precluded from entities that
were not customers at the time of termination. On the other hand, if the employee sells,
for example, consulting and information technology solutions to hospitals and medical
clinics that carry a high price tag and take several months or even years between initial

109

Id.
Herring Gas Company, Inc, v. Magee, 813 F.Supp. 1239, 1245 (“Reasonableness as
to time and space limitations must be determined from the facts of each case.”)
111
See UZ Engineered Products Co. v. Midwest Motor Supply Co., 770 N.E.2d 1068,
1080 (Ohio App. 10 Dist. 2001) review denied 766 N.E.2d 1002 (Ohio 2002)
(noncompete agreement precluding employee from contacting potential customers held
valid); Markovits v. Venture Info Capital, Inc., 129 F.Supp.2d 647, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(upheld restrictive covenant precluding employee from contacting even potential
customers); but see UZ Engineered Products Co. v. Midwest Motor Supply Co., 770
N.E.2d 1068 (Ohio App. 10 Dist. 2001) (“An employer has a legitimate interest in
limiting not only a former employee's ability to take advantage of personal relationships
the employee has developed while representing the employer to the employer's
established client, but also in preventing a former employee from using his former
employer's customer lists or contacts to solicit new customers. (citations omitted). In
addition, an employer has a legitimate interest in preventing a former employee from
using the skill, experience, training, and confidential information the former employee
has acquired during the employee's tenure with his employer in a manner advantageous to
a competitor in attracting business, regardless of whether it was an already established
customer of the former employer.”).
110
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contact and implementation of the products and services, then the employer may
reasonably preclude the former employee from contacting the potential customer.
E. Statutory Schemes
Several jurisdictions have passed statutes pertaining to noncompete agreements.
Generally, these statutes do not provide any specific guidelines; rather, they simply
codify the basic common law rules requiring a reasonable business interests and
reasonable geographic and temporal limitations.112 This is certainly not surprising, as the
variety of employment situations makes drafting specific limitations impossible. The few
statutes to do attempt to provide more precise guidance are still too vague or incomplete
to provide boiler plate application. For example, the Oklahoma statute proscribes
noncompete agreements from prohibiting employees from working in the same industry
or field, but does allow the agreements to preclude employees from soliciting
"established" customers.113 The statute does not, however, define the term “established,”
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See e.g., Wis. Stat §103.465 (2002) (“A covenant by an assistant, servant or agent not
to compete with his or her employer or principal during the term of the employment or
agency, or after the termination of that employment or agency, within a specified territory
and during a specified time is lawful and enforceable only if the restrictions imposed are
reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer or principal.”); Mich. Stat. §
445.774a (2002) ("An employer may obtain from an employee an agreement or covenant
which protects an employer's reasonable competitive business interests and expressly
prohibits an employee from engaging in employment or a line of business after
termination of employment if the agreement or covenant is reasonable as to its duration,
geographical area, and the type of employment or line of business"); Or. Stat. § 653.295
(2005).
113
Ok. Stat. tit. 15 § 219A (2001). Noncompetition agreements:
A. A person who makes an agreement with an employer, whether in writing or
verbally, not to compete with the employer after the employment relationship has
been terminated, shall be permitted to engage in the same business as that
conducted by the former employer or in a similar business as that conducted by
the former employer as long as the former employee does not directly solicit the
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nor does it provide any guidance as to reasonable temporal or geographical limitations.
The few statutes that do attempt to address geographic114 and temporal115 only provide
broad guidelines.
The only specific language that can be found in a survey of state statutes pertains
to limitations on who may be restricted. Some statutes specifically preclude noncompete
agreements for certain occupations, such as physician116 or broadcast industry
employees.117 At least one state limits noncompete agreements to only "Executive and
management personnel and officers and employees who constitute professional staff to
executive and management personnel."118
The statutorily mandated terms approach is too rigid. Employment relationships,
and the products and services sold and provided, are too varied for fixed terms to operate
equitably. These terms are as likely to be inequitable for employees as they are for
employers. A one-year limitation would be unreasonable on a salesperson for a
distributor of routine office products; that same one-year limitation would be unfair to an
employer who provides custom products or services that require long-term planning and
servicing between initial contact and the finalization of the sale.
sale of goods, services or a combination of goods and services from the
established customers of the former employer.
See generally, Jeb Boatman, Contract Law: As Clear as Mud: The Demise of the
Covenant Not To Compete in Oklahoma, 55 Okla. L. Rev. 491 (Fall 2002)
114
S. D. Codified Law. § 53-9-11 (2006) (allowing noncompete agreements that specify
an employee may not compete within " within a specified county, first or second class
municipality, or other specified area")
115
Id. (allowing a noncompete to extend "for any period not exceeding two years from
the date of termination of the agreement"); Col. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113 (West 2003) (two
years).
116
Col. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113 (West 2003); Del. Code. Ann. Tit 6 § 2707 (Westlaw current
through 2006).
117
820 Ill. Comp. Stat. §17/10 (2002).
118
Col. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113 (West 2003).
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IV. Judicial and Statutory Approaches to Unreasonable Terms
While the points of analysis jurisdictions use to determine if the noncompete
agreement contains an unreasonable term are fairly consistent, the remedies jurisdictions
use vary.119 There are three basic approaches jurisdictions use in response to an
unreasonable term: voiding the agreement, using the "Blue Pencil" doctrine to eliminate
an unreasonable term, and using the "Blue Pencil" doctrine to eliminate an unreasonable
term and replace it with a reasonable term.120
A. Agreement Void

119

See generally Ferdinand S. Tinio, Enforceability, Insofar as Restrictions Would be
Reasonable, of Contract Containing Unreasonable Restrictions on Competition, 61
A.L.R.3d 397 (1975).
120
Durapin, Inc. v. American Products, Inc. 559 A.2d 1051, 1058 (R.I. 1989) (discussing
the three approaches, arguing that jurisdictions are moving away from voiding
agreements towards using one of the "Blue Pencil" approaches); Corbin on Contracts
describes the judicial options when a covenant not to compete is overbroad:
"[Some] courts interpret or reform the restrictive promise, if possible, so as to
make the extent and character of its operation reasonable. Some courts will refuse
to enforce any part of the covenant if the covenant was not drafted in the good
faith belief that it was valid. Some courts will refuse to enforce any part unless the
whole is reasonable. These courts may refuse to partially enforce even when the
contract specifically says that it should be partially enforced.
"The approach of enforcing the restriction to the extent it is reasonable is the
approach preferred by many modern courts and is in fact a superior approach. To
refuse to enforce a covenant entirely, even for a minor deviation from the
reasonableness standard, is too harsh a result, given the lack of precision of the
reasonableness analysis and the recognized benefit of reasonably restrictive
covenants.... Courts that have refused to reform covenants not drafted in the good
faith belief that the restraint was valid appropriately safeguarded the legitimate
interests of the employee."
15 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 80.15, at 138-41 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 2003)
(footnote omitted).
30

In several jurisdictions a noncompete agreement is voided if one term is found to
be unreasonable.121 In at least one instance this result is statutorily mandated.122 The
reasoning behind the “all or nothing”123 rule is consistent with a fundamental philosophy
underlying the analysis of noncompete agreements: to limit the agreements to the
minimum restriction necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate business interest.124
The employer, the reasoning goes, will take great precautions to ensure that it does not
include overreaching terms for fear that the entire agreement will be voided.125

121

See, e.g., Quality Liquid Feeds, Inc. v. Plunkett, 2004 WL2809865 (Ark. App. 2004)
(“Further, the contract must be valid as written; the court will not apportion or enforce a
contract to the extent that it might be reasonable.”) citing Bendinger v. Marshalltown
Trowel Co., 994 S.W.2d 468 (Ark. 1999).
122
Wis. Stat. 103.465 (“Any covenant, described in this subsection, imposing an
unreasonable restraint is illegal, void and unenforceable even as to any part of the
covenant or performance that would be a reasonable restraint.”)
123
This phrase was used in Durapin, Inc. v. American Products, Inc. 559 A.2d 1051,
1058 (R.I. 1989) citing Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 36
(Tenn.1984).
124
See generally, Volt Services Group, Div. of Volt Management Corp. v. Addeco
Employment Services, 35 P.3d 329, 334 (Or. App. 2001)(“The reasonableness of a
noncompetition covenant must be determined in view of what is reasonably necessary to
safeguard the employer's protectable interest”); NBZ, Inc. v. Pilarski, 520 N.W.2d 93, 95,
fn2 (Wis.App.1994)( holding that a noncompete “is lawful and enforceable only if the
restrictions imposed are reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer or
principal”); Vlasin v. Len Johnson & Co., Inc., 455 N.W.2d 772, 776-77 (Neb.1990)
(holding that to be upheld the “restriction [must be] reasonable in the sense that it is no
greater than is reasonably necessary to protect the employer in some legitimate interest);
Market America, Inc. v. Christman-Orth, 520 S.E.2d 570, 578 (N.C. App. 1999)(Holding
that a “restraint is unreasonable and void if it is greater than is required for the protection
of the promise) citing Starkings Court Reporting Services v. Collins, 313 S.E.2d 614, 615
(N.C. 1984).
125
See Tatge v. Chambers & Owen, Inc., 579 N.W.2d 217, 227 (Wis. 1998) (Noting that
the Wisconsin statute requires that a noncompete agreement containing an unreasonable
term be declared void and that “This burden was specifically imposed so that "employers
possessing bargaining power superior to that of the employees" would not be encouraged
"to insist upon unreasonable and excessive restrictions, secure in the knowledge that the
promise will be upheld in part, if not in full.").
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In addition, many decisions126 adhering to the all or nothing rule cite an in
terrorem affect of noncompete agreements, as annunciated by Professor Harlan Blake:
"Courts and writers have engaged in hot debate over whether severance
should ever be applied to an employee restraint. The argument against
doing so is persuasive. For every covenant that finds its way to court,
there are thousands which exercise an in terrorem effect on employees
who respect their contractual obligations and on competitors who fear
legal complications if they employ a covenantor, or who are anxious to
maintain gentlemanly relations with their competitors. Thus, the mobility
of untold numbers of employees is restricted by the intimidation of
restrictions whose severity no court would sanction. If severance is
generally applied, employers can fashion truly ominous covenants with
confidence that they will be pared down and enforced when the facts of a
particular case are not unreasonable. This smacks of having one's
employee's cake, and eating it too."127
Jurisdictions using the all-or-nothing theory also quote Blake’s reasoning that
noncompete agreements are quite often akin to contracts of adhesion as the employee
oftentimes does not have legitimate bargaining power.128
At least one court noted that more recent decisions have rejected the all-ornothing rule in favor of some form of judicial modification.129 In the last twenty years,
many courts have utilized one of two forms of the “Blue Pencil” doctrine.130 In one form,
the doctrine is used to remove an unreasonable term from the noncompete agreement,
leaving the remaining terms to be applied. In the other form the doctrine is used to
rewrite the unreasonable term to make it reasonable.

126

See e.g. White v. Fletcher/Mayo/Associates, Inc. , 303 S.E.2d 746, 749 (Ga. 1983);
Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber, D.O., 982 P.2d 1277, 1286 (Ariz. 1999).
127
Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 68283 (Feb. 1960).
128
Id. at 683-94; White, 303 S.E.2d 746 at 749.
129
Durapin, 559 A.2d at 1058.
130
Id. This author is unaware of the origin of the term “Blue Pencil,” although it is
believed to be the color pencil used by editors in the past.
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B. The "Blue Pencil" Doctrine Used to Knock-Out Unreasonable Terms
One approach, taken by numerous jurisdictions, is to remove unreasonable terms
and enforce the agreement as to the remaining, reasonable provisions.131

Within these

jurisdictions, there exists a difference as to when the doctrine may be used. While some
courts will review an agreement more generally to see if certain prohibitions may be
removed132, most require that the unreasonable term or terms be clearly severable from
the reasonable terms.133 The noncompete in such jurisdictions must be grammatically
meaningful after striking out any unreasonable restrictions.134
The issue in many cases is whether the unreasonable term is truly severable from
the reasonable terms. One aspect courts will look for is whether there is an agreement as
to severability in the form of a severability clause.135 Additionally, and more importantly,
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Licocci v. Cardinal Associates, 445 N.E.2d 556, 561 (Ind.1983) ("if the covenant is
clearly separated into parts and some parts are reasonable and others are not, the contract
may be held divisible"); Mich. Stat. 445.774a Agreements not to compete; application

Sec. 4a. (1) An employer may obtain from an employee an agreement or
covenant which protects an employer's reasonable competitive business interests
and expressly prohibits an employee from engaging in employment or a line of
business after termination of employment if the agreement or covenant is
reasonable as to its duration, geographical area, and the type of employment or
line of business. To the extent any such agreement or covenant is found to be
unreasonable in any respect, a court may limit the agreement to render it
reasonable in light of the circumstances in which it was made and specifically
enforce the agreement as limited. (emphasis added).
132
Durapin, 559 A.2d at 1058 (Holding that the best remedy is to allow “unreasonable
restraints to be modified and enforced, whether or not their terms are divisible.”).
133
Product Action International, Inc. v. Mero, 277 F.Supp.2d 919, 926 (S.D. Ind. 2003)
(“if a covenant is clearly separated into parts, and if some parts are reasonable and others
are not, the contract may be severed, or "blue penciled," so that the reasonable portions
may be enforced”).
134
Durapin, 559 A.2d at 1058. citing Wood v. May, 438 P.2d 587, 591 (Wash. 1968).
135
Rockford Mfg., Ltd. v. Bennet, 296 F.Supp.2d 681, 688-89, (D.S.C. 2003); See e.g.
Amex Distributing, Inc. v. Macari, 724 P.2d 596, 604 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986), which
contained the following severability clause:
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courts will look for mechanical severability; one court noted that a covenant is severable
only where it "is in effect a combination of several distinct covenants."136 For example, a
noncompete term which precludes the employee from soliciting customers of both the
employer (parent company) as well as “affiliated companies” is considered two separate
agreements which can be severed to remove the (the presumably unreasonable) term
“affiliated companies.”137 On the other hand, terms such as “100 miles” or “State of
South Carolina” are not severable.138
This severability analysis means that when the three above delineated categories
of reasonableness139 – restrictions on customers and poistions, time, and geography – are
analyzed, two of them, time and geography, are rarely going to be subjected to severance
because “severing overly broad time and territory provisions would eliminate clauses
inherently necessary to a covenant not to compete.”140

Severability :
If any court of competent jurisdiction rules that any portion of this Agreement is
invalid for any reasons, the remainder of the Agreement shall remain in full force
and effect and shall not be affected thereby.
136
Rockford Mfg., 296 F.Supp.2d at 689 quoting Somerset v. Reyner, 104 S.E.2d 344,
348 (1958)). The Somerset court notes that:
"A restrictive covenant which contains or may be read as containing distinct
undertakings bounded by different limits of space or time, or different in subject
matter, may be good as to part and bad as to part. But this does not mean that a
single covenant may be artificially split up in order to pick out some part of it that
it can be upheld. Severance is permissible only in the case of a covenant which is
in effect a combination of several distinct covenants."
Id.
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Rockford Mfg., 296 F.Supp.2d at 689.
Id.
139
See supra notes 68-111 and accompanying text
140
Professional Liability Consultants, Inc. v. Todd, 478 S.E.2d 201 (N.C. Dec 06,
1996)(Adopting the dissenting opinion in Professional Liability Consultants, Inc. v. Todd
468 S.E.2d 578, 583 (N.C. App. 996) as its opinion).
138
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Other jurisdictions have rejected a formal severability analysis in favor of a more
flexible approach.141 “Courts adopting this approach ignore the divisibility aspect and
exercise their inherent equity powers to modify and enforce covenants whether their
phraseology lends itself to severability or not.” 142
C. The "Blue Pencil" Doctrine Used to Rewrite Unreasonable Terms
Courts which reject a strict severability analysis may also utilize the Blue Pencil
doctrine to not only remove an unreasonable term, but also to rewrite the term to make it
reasonable.143 Under this approach, courts exercise there inherent equity powers to the
extent necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate business interest.144

141

Durapin, 559 A.2d at 1058.
Id.
143
See Herring, 813 F. Supp. at 1245 (“If a court finds that the limitations contained in a
covenant not to compete are unreasonable, then the court will modify the limitations so
that they are reasonable.”);
142

See e.g. Bus. and Com.Code§ 15.51 Procedures and Remedies in Actions to Enforce
Covenants Not to Compete
…
(c) If the covenant is found to be ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable
agreement but contains limitations as to time, geographical area, or scope of activity
to be restrained that are not reasonable and impose a greater restraint than is
necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee, the court
shall reform the covenant to the extent necessary to cause the limitations contained
in the covenant as to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained
to be reasonable and to impose a restraint that is not greater than necessary to protect
the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee and enforce the covenant as
reformed, except that the court may not award the promisee damages for a breach of
the covenant before its reformation and the relief granted to the promisee shall be
limited to injunctive relief. If the primary purpose of the agreement to which the
covenant is ancillary is to obligate the promisor to render personal services, the
promisor establishes that the promisee knew at the time of the execution of the
agreement that the covenant did not contain limitations as to time, geographical area,
and scope of activity to be restrained that were reasonable and the limitations
imposed a greater restraint than necessary to protect the goodwill or other business
interest of the promisee, and the promisee sought to enforce the covenant to a
greater extent than was necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest
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An example of the use of the Blue Pencil doctrine to rewrite a noncompete
agreement can be found in the Minnesota Supreme Court decision of Davies v. Davies.145
In Davies, the employee was a bail bonds account representative, a position which
required a license, for his father’s firm.146 The employee signed a noncompete agreement
which precluded him from “engaging in the insurance business for a period of five years
within a 50-mile radius of Minneapolis, St. Paul, or Duluth.”147 Soon after leaving the
agency, the employee began contacting the attorneys he had worked with while at the
agency.148
The court rewrote the noncompete agreement, limiting it to only one year and to
only the county in which the firm did virtually all of its business.149 The court further
edited the agreement to only include actual clients that the employee had contacted.150
The underlying reasoning for allowing a court to rewrite terms is that the parties
have reached a basic agreement that the employee will be restricted in some manner after
the employment relationship ends.151

of the promisee, the court may award the promisor the costs, including reasonable
attorney's fees, actually and reasonably incurred by the promisor in defending the
action to enforce the covenant.
144
Durapin, 559 A.2d at 1058.; Westwind Technologies, Inc. v. Jones,
925 So.2d 166 (Ala. 2005) (“It is clear from our caselaw that, if a covenant not to
compete is overbroad, it is within the power of the courts to narrow it.”) citing Kershaw
v. Knox Kershaw, Inc., 523 So.2d 351, 359 (Ala.1988) ("This Court has previously held
that when an agreement in restraint of trade contains unreasonable limitations, the court
may strike the unreasonable restriction from the agreement, or the court can enforce the
contract within its reasonable limits.")
145
98 N.W.2d 127 (1980)
146
Id. at 128.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 131
150
Id.
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Whether a jurisdiction uses the blue pencil doctrine solely to eliminate an
unreasonable term or it allows a court to rewrite the agreement, the doctrine is generally a
discretionary tool.152 In both types of jurisdictions, courts note that clear overreaching on
the part of the employer may preclude a later argument for use of the Blue Pencil
doctrine.153 As one court stated, the Blue Pencil doctrine should be used “unless the
circumstances indicate bad faith or deliberate overreaching on the part of the
[employer].”154

151

See Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Wohlman, 578 P.2d 530 (Wash. App.1978) citing
Wood v. May, 438 P.2d 587 (Wash. 1968). The Wood court cites with approval S.
Williston, Contracts § 1660 (rev. ed. 1937):
If a sharply defined line separated a restraint which is excessive territorially from
such restraint as is permissible, there seems no reason why effect should not be
given to a restrictive promise indivisible in terms, to the extent that it is lawful. If
it be said that the attempt to impose an excessive restraint invalidates the whole
promise, a similar attempt should invalidate a whole contract, though the
promises are in terms divisible. Questions involving legality of contracts should
not depend on form. Public policy surely is not concerned to distinguish
differences of wording in agreements of identical meaning.
152
See e.g. Hilligoss v. Cargill, Inc., 649 N.W.2d 142, 147 (Minn. 2002)(Noting that, in
rejecting employer’s contention that the doctrine should have been used to make the
agreement reasonable, the Blue Pencil Doctrine may be used at the discretion of the
court); Klick v. Crosstown State Bank of Ham Lake, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Minn. App.
1985)(Holding that use of the Blue Pencil doctrine is discretionary and that the court did
not abuse its discretion when it found that the employer was using a noncompete not to
prevent unfair competition, but as a tool to keep the employee from leaving).
153
See Arpac Corp. v. Murray, 589 N.E.2d 640 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1992) (“Although a
circuit court is not prohibited from modifying restraints embodied in an employment
contract, the fairness of the restraint initially imposed is a relevant consideration of the
court in equity.”); Kayem v. Stewart, 2003 WL 22309466 (Tenn. App. 2003.)(“[U]nless
the circumstances indicate bad faith on the part of the employer, a court will enforce
covenants not to compete to the extent they are reasonably necessary to protect the
employer's interest”) citing Cent. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 37
(Tenn.1984).
154
Durapin, 559 A.2d at 1058; see also Data Management, Inc. v. Greene 757 P.2d 62,
64 (Alaska 1988) (“The third approach, and the one we adopt, is to hold that if an
overbroad covenant not to compete can be reasonably altered to render it enforceable,
then the court shall do so unless it determines the covenant was not drafted in good faith.
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V. Analysis
Let us return to and expand upon our opening hypothetical:
Soon after starting with ABC, Sam Salesperson lands a major account in
Philadelphia for his first sale. Soon afterward, he lands several other major
Philadelphia accounts, due to word of mouth and references within the
Philadelphia medical community. Sam is soon spending all of his time
maintaining and developing these major accounts and making a good living doing
so. ABC hires other salespeople to market in the rest of Pennsylvania and in New
Jersey. Three years later, Sam leaves ABC to work for a competitor.
Is it fair to find the geographic limitation in the noncompete unreasonable
because Sam only sold in Philadelphia? Would it be fair to Sam to preclude him
from selling in all of Pennsylvania and New Jersey?
Even assuming all other terms are reasonable, a close analysis of the geographic
limitation in this hypothetical shows the inadequacy of the current approaches and
underscores the need for noncompete agreements to become malleable documents that
adjust along with the employee’s duties. Each of the three current approaches is
addressed below, but first a preliminary question, one that is rarely ever explicitly
addressed by courts, must be raised:
At what point do we look at the reasonableness of the terms of the noncompete?
The two options are, of course, to look at the reasonableness at the time the agreement
was signed or at the time the employment relationship ends. While the question is rarely
explicitly addressed, its resolution is critical to an evaluation of the reasonableness of a
noncompete agreement and also brings to bear the impact that a jurisdiction’s rule
The burden of proving that the covenant was drafted in good faith is on the employer.”);
Estee Lauder Companies Inc. v. Batra, 430 F.Supp.2d 158, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting
that a court may sever terms and partially enforce the agreement if "the employer
demonstrates an absence of overreaching, coercive use of dominant bargaining power, or
other anti-competitive misconduct, but has in good faith sought to protect a legitimate
business interest, consistent with reasonable standards of fair dealing"); .
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regarding consideration for noncompete agreements signed after commencement of
employment should play in the overall remedy scheme.155
A. Jurisdictions Using the “Agreement Void” Rule
In jurisdictions utilizing the “all or nothing” approach, the point at which the
reasonableness of the agreement is determined is crucial. If a court analyzing the above
hypothetical were to look at the reasonableness of the agreement at the time the
employment relationship ended, it would certainly find the agreement unreasonable, as
the geographic limitation is far greater than necessary to protect its legitimate business
interests. In an all or nothing jurisdiction, Sam Salesperson would be free to call on his
current customers immediately.
If a court were to look at the reasonableness of the agreement at the time it was
signed, it would find the geographic term reasonable, as ABC and Sam certainly
envisioned sales throughout the territory. The result would be that Sam would not only
be barred from calling on his Philadelphia customers, but would also be unfairly
precluded from selling in the rest of Pennsylvania and New Jersey.
These divergent outcomes underscore the need to incorporate a jurisdiction’s rule
on consideration for noncompete agreements signed after commencement of employment

155

One statute that mandates that a noncompete agreement be analyzed as of the
circumstances at time of formation is Texas Stat. 15.50 ("a covenant not to compete is
enforceable if it is ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement at the time
the agreement is made to the extent that it contains limitations as to time, geographical
area, and scope of activity to be restrained that are reasonable and do not impose a greater
restraint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the
promisee"). But see Wis. Stat 103.465 (noting that a noncompete is lawful and
enforceable only if the restrictions imposed are reasonably necessary) and Mich. Stat.
445.774a (“if the agreement or covenant is reasonable”), both of which, while not
explicitly directing, indicate that the agreement is be analyzed as to the applicable facts at
the time of termination of employment.
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into the overall remedy analysis. If the reasonableness of the agreement as of the time
the employment relationship ended, which is common, then employers must have the
ability to easily alter the noncompete so that the terms reflect an employee’s current
duties and responsibilities. It is unrealistic in many employment situations to expect the
employer to be able to accurately predict the scope of an employee’s duties five, ten, or
more years down the road. Territories and customer bases may expand or shrink, new
products may be added or the employee may end up focusing on only a few of the
employer’s products, and technologies and general duties may change. It is unrealistic to
require new consideration each time a change takes place. A better approach, as
presented below, is to foster a system in which the employer and employee, with
adequate safeguards, are encourage to regularly review and update the noncompete
agreement to accurately reflect the employee’s duties.

B. Jurisdictions Employing the Blue Pencil “Knockout” Rule
The Blue Pencil "knockout" method is also problematic, as it is unclear how this
approach can work as a practical matter with many key noncompete terms. Courts using
this method often emphatically state that they do not have the power to rewrite
contractual provisions.156 However, if key terms are simply knocked out, the agreement
itself may be unenforceable as a practical matter. For example, in our hypothetical a

156

See e.g. Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1286 (Ariz. 1999) (“the
court cannot create a new agreement for the parties to uphold the contract.”); Moore v.
Midwest Distribution, Inc., 65 S.W.3d 490, 494 (Ark. App. 2002) (“Our supreme court
further stated ‘that the court would not vary the terms of a written agreement between the
parties; to do so would mean that the court would be making a new contract, and it has
consistently held that this will not be done.’”) quoting Bendinger v. Marshalltown
Trowell Co., 994 S.W.2d 468 (1999).
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court could not simply knock out the geographical limitation because the noncompete
would then read so as to preclude Sam Salesperson from selling anywhere for two years.
Certainly the intended consequence of finding a geographic limitation unreasonable is not
to extend the prohibition indefinitely. The agreement is simply unenforceable without
the geographic limitation.
Of the three primary terms in a noncompete agreement (temporal, geographic, and
occupational), the temporal and geographic limitations are required terms. While,
occasionally, a portion of the occupational limitation can be knocked out, the temporal
and geographic terms must be included. If say, ABC’s noncompete agreement precluded
Sam Salesperson from marketing software and hardware to ABC’s customers, the term
“and hardware” could be eliminated and the agreement can still be enforced. However,
the parties must know for how long and in what territory Sam is precluded from selling
software for the agreement to be workable and enforceable.

C. Jurisdictions Using the Blue Pencil “Rewrite” Rule
On the surface, allowing a court to rewrite on reasonable provisions to make them
usable seems to be the most equitable as to the final outcome. Employers receive the
protection they contracted for and employees are only restricted to the extent necessary to
protect the employer's legitimate business interest. However, there are legitimate
concerns over this approach.
First of all, the rewrite approach does nothing to discourage employers from
seeking the broadest possible protections at the commencement of the noncompete
agreement because the employer can rely on the court to rein in any excesses. While an
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employer's fervor can be tempered by a rule which requires good faith in the drafting, the
reality is that many of the occupations in which noncompete agreements are most
common and needed - sales and “customer contact” positions - began without either the
employer or employee knowing where the sales and customer contact leads and
development will take the employee. As such, most employers would have at least a
reasonable argument for a fairly broad noncompete agreement.
This “good faith” analysis also brings us back to the initial question posed in this
section: at what point do we judge the reasonableness of the agreement? If we are to look
at the reasonableness at the time of drafting then we must give employers even greater
leeway in predicting the scope of the employee’s duties at some time in the future.
Further, when reasonableness at the time of drafting is the issue, an analysis of the "good
faith" of the employer is rife with potential problems of proof, particularly in regards to
those employees who have been with the employer for significant period of time. It is
easy to conceive a situation where an experience salesperson/customer contact employee
who has been with an employer for 10 years was initially trained and managed by
employees that have long since left the company. As such, it often may be difficult to
determine whether the original limitations in the noncompete agreement were reasonable
based upon the employer's expectation of the employee at the time of hire.
Further, the in terrorem effect of a noncompete agreement, espoused by Professor
Blake157 and noted by numerous courts, should not be discounted. Many employees will,
when faced with even unreasonable noncompete agreement terms, choose simply to
honor the agreement due to lack of legal knowledge and/or for fear of a lawsuit and

157

See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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accompanying expenses. As such, employers should be discouraged from overreaching
in the initial drafting of the noncompete agreement.
Finally, the hesitancy of courts to create terms to an agreement that differ from
those agreed upon by the parties is well-founded. Courts should interpret contracts, not
create them. A better policy, as discussed above, is to create a system that encourages
employers and employees to regularly review and update the noncompete agreement.
In sum, each of the three responses to unreasonable terms is flawed. Voiding an
entire agreement for an unreasonable term is, while the best method to discourage
overreaching by employers, potentially unfair, particularly to employers who act in good
faith at the time of drafting but are unable to precisely determine the scope of the
employee’s duties as they evolve over the employment relationship. Eliminating an
unreasonable term is unworkable for too many agreements because some terms are
necessary for the agreement to function; it is inequitable to allow some agreements to be
“saved” simply because the employer was fortunate enough to overreach on a term that
can be severed. Finally, allowing judicial modification of the agreement rests too much
power in the employer’s drafting, allowing the employer to seek maximum protection
with the knowledge that the court will cure any deficiencies.

VI. Proposed Noncompete Agreement Remedy Statute
The following proposed scheme is designed to encourage employers and
employees to reach noncompete agreements at the commencement of employment and
then regularly review and update the agreement to reflect the employee’s duties. This
scheme also takes into account the important role that the rules pertaining to
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consideration should play in creating a fair and equitable remedy for unreasonable terms
in a noncompete agreement.

1. Consideration
a. If signed prior to the commencement of employment, no additional
consideration is required.158
b. If the noncompete agreement is signed after the commencement of
employment, consideration beyond continued employment must be given
by the employer. This consideration must be directly linked to the signing
of the noncompete agreement and must include one or more of the
following:
i. A one-time bonus equaling or exceeding 5% of the employee’s
salary
ii. A permanent pay raise equaling or exceeding 3% of the
employee’s salary
iii. For a salesperson: an expanded territory or other marketing
opportunities, including additional products or services, which
carry a reasonable expectation for a permanent pay increase
equaling or exceeding 3% of the employee’s salary
iv. A promotion which includes a significant increase in title and
responsibility.159
2. Alteration of an Existing Noncompete Agreement
a. If a valid noncompete agreement is in place between employer and
employee, no additional consideration is necessary for the parties to agree
to alter the terms of the agreement.
b. If an employer wishes to alter a noncompete agreement, the employer
must present the noncompete agreement in writing to the employee, with
158

This is the standard rule, followed by all jurisdictions.
The reasoning behind section 1(b) is to strongly encourage employers to present
noncompete agreements to prospective employees for signing prior to commencement of
employment. This rule recognizes that an employee who is presented with a noncompete
agreement after commencement of employment is in a very difficult predicament in
which the employee has very little bargaining power. This rule requires a significant
financial outlay on the part of the employer to support an agreement after commencement
of employment.
The rule does, however, provide a reasonable alternative for the employer who
wants to promote an employee in a house. Such might be the case with an administrative
employee or factory or warehouse employee who wants to move into a sales or executive
position. The rule allows for the significant promotion itself to provide the wired
consideration. In addition, such a promotion would almost always entail a significant pay
raise (or lease the possibility of a pay raise due to commissions).

159
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the employee’s rights and responsibilities clearly stated and the changes
clearly identified.160
c. Once the employee is presented with the altered noncompete agreement,
the employee has twenty-one days to:
i. Sign the noncompete agreement as presented;
ii. Present a counter-proposal to the employer; or
iii. Refuse to sign the altered noncompete agreement161
3. Remedy for an Unreasonable Term
a. If the parties have a signed agreement and the court finds a term to be
unreasonable, the agreement is VOID, subject to section (b) of this
subdivision.162
b. If the parties have a signed agreement, the employer has presented an
altered agreement to the employee and the employee refused to sign the
agreement or the parties were unable to reach an agreement following a
counter-proposal from the employee, the court may, in its discretion, use
the Blue Pencil doctrine to cross out an unreasonable term(s) and replace it
with a reasonable term. In determining if it should utilize the Blue Pencil
doctrine, the court should consider:
i. The reasonableness of the signed agreement
ii. The reasonableness of the un-signed, altered agreement
iii. The reasonableness of the employee’s counter-proposal, if any163
160

While it may, at first blush, seem unreasonable to require a new agreement, creating
the new agreement should be relatively straight forward and require little supervision
from the attorney who originally drafted the agreement. The manager would only need to
alter the pertinent provisions of the documents to more accurately coincide with the
employee’s current duties. This may require, for example, altering the geographic term
to coincide with current geographic territory or customer list or adding or deleting
product lines, any of which can be accomplished by a manager. Further, the document
itself can be incorporated into the employee’s regular performance review, so as to make
the experience less confrontational.
161
This section allows an employer to alter the terms of an existing noncompete
agreement without the need for additional consideration. The reasoning behind this rule
is twofold. First, the employer and the employee have already agreed upon some
protection for the employer at the termination of the employment relationship. Second,
and in conjunction with the terms in subdivision 3, the employer has the ability, and the
obligation, to regularly monitor the noncompete agreement to ensure that is reasonable in
light of the employee's current duties.
162
This rule provides the maximum protection for employees, as employers must craft
noncompete agreements that are not overly broad and protect only legitimate business
interests and monitor those agreements regularly to ensure that an employee's changing
work duties are accurately reflected in the agreement.
163
This section allows for court flexibility in situations in which an employer attempts to
alter an existing noncompete agreement, but the employee and employer are not able to
agree on altered terms. The court may take that into consideration an employer’s attempt
45

Conclusion
Employer-employee noncompete agreement litigation is not going away. The
agreements are too important to employers, too burdensome on employees, and too fact
intensive to be eliminated. Courts, and, in particular, legislative bodies should consider
the important policy considerations when choosing a remedy for unreasonable terms in a
noncompete agreement. Further, the role of consideration in the remedy scheme should
be considered to create a scheme that encourages regular review and updating of the
noncompete agreement between employers and employees.

to alter the terms of a noncompete agreement to coincide with an employee's current
duties. This section also encourages employees to actively work to reach an agreement
with their employer. If an employer has acted in good faith and attempted to update the
agreement to coincide with the employee’s duties, the court should use the Blue Pencil
doctrine to revise any unreasonable terms to make them reasonable.
46

